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ABSTRACT
Permissionless blockchain environments necessitate the use
of a fast and attack-resilient message propagation protocol
for Block and Transaction messages to keep nodes synchro-
nised and avoid forks. We present GossipSub, a gossip-based
pubsub protocol, which, in contrast to past pubsub protocols,
incorporates resilience against a wide spectrum of attacks.
Firstly, GossipSub’s mesh construction implements an eager
push model keeps the fan-out of the pubsub delivery low and
balances excessive bandwidth consumption and fast mes-
sage propagation throughout the mesh. Secondly, through
gossip dissemination, GossipSub realises a lazy-pull model to
reach nodes far-away or outside the mesh. Thirdly, through
constant observation, nodes maintain a score profile for the
peers they are connected to, allowing them to choose the
most well-behaved nodes to include in the mesh. Finally,
and most importantly, a number of tailor-made mitigation
strategies designed specifically for these three components
make GossipSub resilient against the most challenging Sybil-
based attacks. We test GossipSub in a testbed environment
involving more than 5000 VM nodes deployed on AWS and
show that it stays immune to all considered attacks. Gos-
sipSub is currently being integrated as the main messaging
layer protocol in the Filecoin and the Ethereum 2.0 (ETH2.0)
blockchains.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain environments require a message layer protocol
to propagate transaction and block messages. Transaction
messages are those that transfer value, normally in the form
of tokens or crypto-assets between different nodes in the
network. Block messages are produced by a subset of nodes,
the “miner” nodes, to group sets of transactions together,
update the state of the blockchain and keep all nodes in sync.
Being up-to-date, or synchronised, with regard to both trans-
action and block messages is a very important requirement
in blockchain networks and it is the task of the message
propagation protocol to achieve. In the opposite case, nodes
have differing views of the state of the network, are working
on different data-sets and cause the blockchain to fork.
Furthermore, open blockchain networks, such as Bitcoin
[10], Ethereum [17] and Filecoin [2] are “permissionless” with
no central control by any entity or organisation to oversee
and manage access control (i.e., the identity of nodes joining
the network). The network is an open, unstructured peer-
to-peer (P2P) network and can be joined by any node that
claims to run the protocol. Malicious nodes can, therefore,
join and try to distort the view of nodes with regards to
latest transactions and blocks with the aim of disrupting
the network or stealing monetary value. Malicious activity
is most commonly realised through Sybil nodes [11] that
can carry out a range of attacks, the most prominent of
which is the eclipse attack [16, 31] i.e., silencing of nodes
in order to cause packet loss and in turn, blockchain forks.
Given that those networks carry large amounts of monetary
value, potentially in the order of hundreds of millions of
dollars, they are very attractive to attackers. Therefore, the
messaging layer protocol of a blockchain network has to be
ar
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resilient against malicious nodes that attack the network by
dropping or delaying messages.
The most straightforward strategy to alleviate both mes-
sage propagation speed and resilience/security concerns in
permission-less, unstructured P2P networks is flooding - used
in the Bitcoin network [10, 24]. Flooding ensures that mes-
sages propagate as fast as possible throughout the network
and is robust against eclipse attacks, as it introduces high
levels of traffic redundancy. Flooding, however, is very ex-
pensive in terms of bandwidth. Authors in [24] report that
up to 44% of the overall traffic of the Bitcoin network is re-
dundant. This figure translates to a bandwidth requirement
of up to 350GBs/month for a public Bitcoin node and for the
current network size.
“Gossip”-based pubsub protocols have been introduced
in the past as a way to limit the number of messages prop-
agated between peers in pub/sub systems [21], [5], [20]. In
gossip-based approaches, peers forward metadata related to
messages they have “seen” without forwarding the messages
themselves, a method generally called lazy pull. However,
given that past systems were either centralised from the
point of view of (ownership and) access control, or were
not carrying any commercial/financial weight, they were not
designed to be resilient against attacks.
In this paper, we are proposing GossipSub, a gossip-based
pubsub protocol that is designed to deal with both fast and
resilient message propagation in permissionless networks.
GossipSub consists of two main components, the Mesh Con-
struction and the Score Function, as well as a set of mitigation
mechanisms designed exclusively on top of the two afore-
mentioned protocol components. As we show here, the com-
bination of these parts render the protocol resilient against a
wide-range of attacks, responsive to dynamic network con-
ditions and fast in terms of message propagation.
(1) The Mesh Construction: GossipSub introduces a con-
nected global mesh structure, where each node is con-
nected to a limited number of other peers forming its local
(view of the) mesh. Mesh-connected nodes directly share
messages with one another, realising an eager push com-
munication model. Nodes can join and leave the mesh
based on network-level conditions or application-level
semantics. Those nodes that are not part of the mesh
communicate with mesh-connected nodes through gos-
sip (i.e., lazy push).
(2) The Score Function: Every node participating in the
network is constantly being observed by all of the nodes
it is connected to (whether in the same local mesh or
not). We have carefully selected a number of actions that
either flag malicious activity (e.g., dropped messages),
or highlight good behaviour (e.g., fast message delivery)
and have built a weight-based scoring function to rank
peers according to their behaviour in the network. Every
peer keeps a score for every other peer it is connected
to and does not share this score with others. Instead, it
makes routing and relaying decisions based on its own
view of other nodes.
(3) The Mitigation Strategies: Building directly on the
properties introduced by the mesh construction and the
scoring function, we complement GossipSub with a set
of mitigation strategies to protect its operation against
malicious activity. Indicatively, these strategies include:
controlled mesh maintenance through score-driven par-
ticipation, scoped flooding for newly published messages
and score-based node isolation when malicious activity
is detected.
In GossipSub-based systems all nodes start equal and build
their profile based on their behaviour. Well-behaved nodes
are generally part of themesh, while nodes with questionable
or malicious intentions are progressively excluded from the
mesh to the gossip network and then from the network as a
whole.
GossipSub is the first of its kind protocol that addresses
both the speed and the resilience challenges of permission-
less message propagation environments that carry high mon-
etary value. It has been adopted and is currently been inte-
grated as the main transaction and block propagation proto-
col in the Filecoin network [2], an incentivized, decentralised
storage network, and the Ethereum (ETH2.0) network [1], a
decentralised smart contract computation network. Despite
carrying utility on top, these systems are primarily financial
systems at the transaction and block propagation level and
are expected to carry transaction messages potentially worth
millions in monetary value. That said, the performance and
security properties of GossipSub need to be investigated in
detail. That said, it is imperative to detail the performance
and security properties of GossipSub, which is the primary
focus of this paper.
The contributions of the paper are as follows.
• We introduce GossipSub to fill the gap of attack-resistant
message propagation protocols for permissionless blockchains.
While previous literature has investigated extensively the
efficiency of (gossip-based) pubsub protocols, the need for
resilience against attacks did not surface due to limited
financial incentives from the attacker’s point of view.
• We build a VM-based testbed environment that supports
experiment reproducibility and test the ∼16k LOC produc-
tion code on 5000 containers in AWS. Each container has
1.2 vCPUs and 2 GB RAM. We test Sybil:honest node
connection ratios of up to 40:1, although mostly present
results with up to 20:1.
• We test GossipSub in a wide range of attack scenarios
(only a limited part of which is reported here) and validate
GossipSub: Attack-Resilient Message Propagation in the Filecoin and ETH2.0 Networks PL-TechRep-2020-002, July 2020,
its resistance against the most primitive of attacks. We
find that an average of $40,000 per month as operational
expenditure for coordinated attacks does not constitute a
successful attack under any of the metrics derived from
the Filecoin or ETH2.0 networks.
2 BACKGROUND & RELATEDWORK
In the absence of central control in permission-less, dis-
tributed P2P networks there are two components that need
particular attention: i) distributed consensus to secure the
cryptographic part of the network, and ii) fast and resilient
message propagation. Significant research efforts have re-
cently been invested in the first component, that is, in secur-
ing permission-less blockchains from the distributed consen-
sus perspective [6]. However, there has been very limited
work focusing on the component of fast and secure message
propagation [26].
2.1 The Filecoin Network
Filecoin is an incentivized, decentralised, P2P storage net-
work. Storage miners contribute storage capacity to the net-
work and get compensated in FIL - the utility token (or cryp-
tocurrency) of the Filecoin network. Filecoin clients are in-
dividuals who are interested in storing their data on the
Filecoin network. Filecoin users are companies that provide
services on top of the Filecoin network, e.g., storage and web
hosting. Clients operate a “client node”, while users operate
a “full node” in order to participate in the network. Storage
miners on the other hand, calculate cryptographic proofs for
other miners to verify that they behave honestly and provide
valuable service to the network.
Filecoinminersmine on “(block) tipsets”. Tipsets are groups
of five blocks, which are produced upon every mining round,
that is, every 30 seconds. In order to produce the next set
of blocks, miners must have received the blocks produced
in the previous round within 6 seconds after the end of the
previous round. Therefore, the deadline of 6 seconds is a
hard requirement for the Filecoin blockchain. Failing to meet
this deadline will result in a blockchain fork, as miners will
not be in sync, i.e., they will be mining on different tipsets.
The Filecoin network is currently running in “testnet”
mode to validate correct operation of all of its components.
The size of the “testnet” is currently ∼300 nodes, with over
6PB of storage committed. The Filecoin mainnet is expected
to launch with approximately 1000 nodes in mid 2020 and
grow up to 30,000 nodes within the first 12 months. The ratio
of miner to full nodes is expected to be in the range of 1:10.
Miner nodes are powerful machines in order to calculate the
proofs, while full nodes are normal user machines or servers,
as needed depending on the application. That said, attacker
nodes targeting message propagation are most likely to be
full nodes as compared to miner nodes.
The size of transaction messages varies between 100B and
2KB. The size of Block messages is approximately 1.5KB.
In terms of message rates, it is expected that there will be
at least two transaction message per second and five block
messages per mining round, where each mining round lasts
30 seconds, hence, 10 block messages per minute. At the
messaging layer, the pubsub protocol will operate two topics:
one for transactions and one for blocks. Reliable, secure and
fast message propagation is more important for the blocks
topic than for the transactions topic. This is because the
worst case scenario for a delayed transaction is for it to
be included in a subsequent block, whereas the worst case
scenario for a delayed block is a blockchain fork.
2.2 The ETH2.0 Network
Ethereum is a smart-contract computation platform (some-
times referred to as a “programmable blockchain” ) that is op-
erational since 2015. It has been designed to run decentralized
computations, in the form of smart contracts, where computa-
tions are validated by all nodes in the network. The Ethereum
network has evolved into a smart-contract computation plat-
form, used by the vast majority of projects in the area. The
network is carrying a total of $25B in monetary value and is
the second biggest cryptocurrency in terms of market cap,
after Bitcoin. The first version of Ethereum (ETH1.0) has
been using a “Proof-of-Work” consensus scheme and a sim-
ple message propagation protocol, according to which every
node broadcasts every message to sqrt(N) nodes, where N
is the size of the network. The second, improved version of
Ethereum (ETH2.0) will adopt a “Proof-of-Stake” consensus
and will also use GossipSub as the message propagation pro-
tocol for blocks and transaction messages. The migration to
ETH2.0 is expected before the end of 2020.
Unlike Filecoin, the ETH2.0 network has a hard deadline of
block propagation at 12 sec. Block messages should in fact be
delivered earlier to allow time for validation, cryptographic
operations and state management. ETH2.0 will also have
many more topics as part of the messaging protocol than
Filecoin, starting with up to 70 and with possibility to in-
crease to a few hundred topics that the pubsub protocol will
have to handle. The overall size of the network is expected
to be in the area of 5k-10k with not all nodes subscribed to
all topics. The load in terms of message rates will be larger
in ETH2.0 than in the Filecoin network, expected in the area
of tens of messages per second per topic.
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2.3 Bitcoin Message Propagation
The Bitcoin network consists of approximately 60,000 nodes
split in public and private nodes. Public nodes have a pub-
lic IP address, while private ones are those behind NATs
(i.e., primarily home users). Private nodes open up to 8 out-
bound connections and no inbound connections (to avoid
NAT issues), while public nodes maintain up to 125 inbound
connections and 8 outbound connections. When a node first
joins the network, it learns about its first peers from a boot-
strap DNS node (these are run by volunteers and pick a
random set of peers from the network to introduce to the
new node).
The Bitcoin blockchain uses a simple broadcast (i.e., flood-
ing) protocol to disseminate transaction and block messages.
The bandwidth requirement for a Bitcoin node to relay trans-
action messages only, according to the current network size
and node connectivity settings is 18GBs/month for private
nodes [24]. The figure for public nodes who maintain many
more connections is a staggering 350GBs/month. As the net-
work grows or as more connections are allowed per node,
this figure is expected to increase dramatically, making the
Bitcoin network prohibitively expensive to operate.
Several studies have investigated both the topology and
themessage propagation characteristics of the Bitcoin blockchain
[3, 4, 9, 19, 25]. In a recent proposal to tackle the redundancy
of the Bitcoin propagation protocol, the authors in [24] find
that almost 90% of the bandwidth used to propagate transac-
tion messages carry redundant information. Erlay uses flood-
ing for message propagation between public nodes and two
rounds of “set reconciliation” with a smart cross-checking
technique, called “minisketch”, between the rest of the nodes
in order to synchronise messages across the network.
The security of the Bitcoin broadcast protocol has also
been subject to extensive studies [7, 32]. In [16], the authors
investigate the bootstrap mechanism of the protocol. The
authors in [25] investigate timing attacks on the Bitcoin
network in order to infer its topology.
Although the Bitcoin network has not been successfully
compromised, the body of work outlined above highlights
the importance of security at the network and messaging
layer of open, permissionless blockchains.
2.4 Prior Art in PubSub
PubSub systems have been deployed extensively in commer-
cial settings in the past and as such have been designed with
several requirements in mind [12], [13], [22]. Such require-
ments include reliable delivery in presence of node churn,
load-balancing amongst message relay nodes, scalability as
networks grow and resource efficiency to avoid excessive
duplicate message delivery.
Gossip-based approaches have also received considerable
attention, due to the balance they bring between bandwidth
consumption and performance guarantees [5, 8, 14, 23, 28–
30, 34].
While these proposals have helped advance the topic of
gossip-based pubsub significantly, none of them has been
designed with Sybil-resistance in mind. Instead, security in
pubsub systems has investigated issues related to message
encryption, digital signatures and access control [27, 33]. Aswe
will show, the performance penalty of conventional pubsub
protocols without security protections is so severe in case of
attacks that protocol design decisions have virtually no effect.
As such, these protocols do not constitute direct points of
comparison for GossipSub. We therefore turn out attention
and focus on comparing the behaviour of GossipSub against
message propagation protocols used in similar environments,
that is, flooding in the Bitcoin and sqrt(N) in the ETH1.0
blockchain.
3 ATTACK TYPES IN PERMISSIONLESS
BLOCKCHAINS
Given the open, permissionless environment of blockchain
networks, a message propagation protocol needs to be re-
sistant against the following list of primitive attacks, all of
which target delayed message propagation and eventually
forking the blockchain.
Sybil Attack: This is the most common form of attack in
P2P networks, since creating large numbers of identities is
generally cheap resource-wise, unless cryptographic puzzles
are included as part of joining the system. In the case of
GossipSub, Sybils will attempt to get into the mesh, through
a process called grafting, as we will see in the next Section.
This is a first step for carrying out all of the following attacks.
Eclipse Attack: This attack can be carried out against
a single victim or the whole network. The objective is to
silence the victim by refusing to propagate messages from
it or to distort its view by delaying message propagation
towards it.
Censorship Attack: Sybils seek to establish themselves
in the mesh and propagate all messages except those pub-
lished by the target peer. In contrast to the Eclipse Attack,
in the Censorship Attack Sybils appear to behave properly
from all vantage points, but hairpin-drop the victim’s mes-
sages. The objective of the attacker is to censor the target and
prevent its messages from reaching the rest of the network.
This attack is difficult to detect by monitoring and scoring
peers, as the Sybils build up score by virtue of propagating
all other messages.
Cold Boot Attack: In this attack, honest and Sybil nodes
join concurrently when the network bootstraps; honest peers
attempt to build their mesh, while connecting to both Sybil
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and honest peers. Since there is no score built up from a
warm, honest-only network to protect the mesh, the Sybils
manage to largely take over.
The attack can take place in two cases: i) when the network
bootstraps with Sybils joining at t0, and ii) when new nodes
are joining the network while the network is under attack.
Although the first one is quite unlikely to happen, the second
is likely to occur as the network grows.
Flash & Covert Flash Attack: In the Flash attack, Sybils
connect and attack the network at once. In the Covert Flash
Attack, Sybils connect to the network but behave properly
for some time in order to build up score. Then, they execute a
coordinated attack whereby they stop propagating messages
altogether in an attempt to completely disrupt the network.
The attack is difficult to identify before the attackers turn
malicious as they behave properly up to that point and build
a good profile.
4 GOSSIPSUB: THE GOSSIPING MESH
CONSTRUCTION
GossipSub consists of two tightly-coupled components with
each one of them primarily addressing one of the challenges
introduced earlier, namely: themesh constructionwhich lever-
ages gossiping for establishing fast, resource-efficient and
scalable message propagation (discussed in this Section) and
the score function for resilience against malicious activity
(discussed in the next Section).
4.1 Peer Discovery
Peer discovery can be driven by arbitrary external means and
is pushed outside the core functionality of GossipSub. This
allows for orthogonal, application-driven development and
no external dependencies for the protocol implementation.
Nonetheless, the protocol supports: i) Peer Exchange, which
allows applications to bootstrap from a known set of boot-
strap peers without an external peer discovery mechanism,
and ii) Explicit Peering Agreements, where the application
can specify a list of peers to which nodes should connect
when joining.
4.1.1 Peer Exchange. This process is supported through ei-
ther bootstrap nodes or other normal peers.
Bootstrap nodes are maintained by system operators. They
have to be stable and operate independently of the mesh
construction, that is, bootstrap nodes do not maintain con-
nections to the mesh. Bootstrap nodes maintain scores for
peers they interact with (we discuss scoring in Sec. 5) and
refuse to serve misbehaving peers and/or advertise misbe-
having peers’ addresses to others. They also participate in
propagating gossip. Their role is to facilitate formation and
maintenance of the network.
In terms of peer exchange between normal peers, when-
ever a node is excluded from the mesh, e.g., due to over-
subscription (see PRUNE message in Section 4.2), the prun-
ing peer provides it with a list of alternative nodes, which it
can use to reconnect, re-build or extend its mesh.
4.1.2 Explicit Peering Agreements. With explicit peering, the
application can specify a list of peers which nodes should
connect to when joining. For every explicit peer, the router
must establish and maintain a bidirectional (reciprocal) con-
nection. Explicit peering connections exist outside the mesh,
which in practice means that every new valid incoming mes-
sage is forwarded to all of a peer’s explicit peers.
4.2 Building the Mesh
The mesh is the basic building block of the GossipSub pro-
tocol. Each node maintains a list of peers with which it is
directly connected with bidirectional, reciprocal links, form-
ing its local mesh.
The local mesh of each node is the group of nodes that
connects it to the global mesh. Messages propagate through
their first-hop connections to reach neighbour local meshes
and propagate further. In Fig. 1 we present the structure and
interactions between nodes in GossipSub.
A A1
C
D = 5
D = 4
X
Global Mesh
Construction
Gossip Only Nodes
Node C's 
Local Mesh
Node A's 
Local Mesh
Mesh Connection
Gossip Connection
Figure 1: The GossipSub Mesh Construction
When a node wants to either publish or relay a message
it has received, it broadcasts the message to its local mesh
only. The recipients of that message that have built and
maintain their own local-meshes will propagate it further
through the construction. Note that it is not necessary for
every participating node to have an established local mesh as
nodes can issue direct requests through gossip for messages
that they have not received (we describe the details of the
gossip process in Section 4.3).
The number of peers that a node maintains a direct con-
nection with as part of its local mesh, D, is the desired degree
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of the network per topic and therefore, the amplification
factor of the protocol.
The overlay is initially constructed according to the peer
discovery mechanisms discussed in Section 4.1. The param-
eters of GossipSub related to the mesh construction are: D,
which is the target degree, and two relaxed degree parame-
ters D_low and D_high, representing admissible mesh degree
bounds. The goal of the degree parameters is to introduce
elasticity and curtail excessive flapping. When the direct
connections in a node’s mesh exceed D_high, the node is
over-subscribed and needs to exclude (PRUNE) some nodes
from its mesh, while when the number of connections falls
below D_low, the node is under-subscribed and needs to in-
clude (GRAFT) new nodes in its mesh.
DD_low D_high
GR
AF
T
PR
UN
EAccept GRAFT
Requests
Figure 2: Balancing the Mesh
Higher values for the D_* values translate to lower mes-
sage propagation latency as the global mesh is more densely
connected. However, better connectivity comes with higher
bandwidth cost as messages are directly forwarded to more
peers. For the purposes of this study, we have set D=8, D_low=6,
D_high=12 in order to preserve low-fan out and therefore, re-
duce bandwidth requirements, but at the same time achieve
timely message propagation. We discuss tradeoffs in the next
subsection and carry out a detailed sensitivity analysis to
justify our choices in Section 10.2.
This set of parameters is later extended to include: i)
D_score to rank peers in the mesh, according to their be-
haviour, as observed by the scoring function, and ii) D_out
to set a minimum number of outbound connections per peer.
We discuss these later in Section 6.
The protocol defines five control messages and a heartbeat:
• GRAFT a mesh link: this notifies the peer that it has been
added to the local mesh of the grafting node.
• PRUNE a mesh link: this notifies the peer that it has been
removed from the local mesh of the pruning peer.
• PRUNE-Peer Exchange (PX): the pruning peer sends a
list of peer IDs to the pruned peer to help it connect to
alternative peers and expand its mesh. There is a back-
off timer associated with pruning to avoid re-grafting to
recent peers for a period of time (set to 1min).
• IHAVE: gossip; this notifies the peer that the following
messages were recently seen and are available on request.
• IWANT: gossip; request transmission ofmessages announced
in an IHAVE message.
The protocol also implements two simple messages to join
and leave a topic, JOIN[topic] and LEAVE[topic], which
are implemented through a GRAFT[topic] and LEAVE[topic]
message, respectively.
Finally, the router periodically runs a heartbeat procedure,
which is responsible for maintaining the mesh and emitting
gossip. The value of the heartbeat is set to 1 s in our current
implementation. As we will discuss later in Section 6, mesh
maintenance is responsible for clearing out badly-behaving
nodes from the mesh.
4.3 The Gossip Factor
Gossip messages propagate metadata throughout the net-
work. The metadata can be arbitrary, but as a baseline we
include the message IDs that the router emitting the gossip
has seen in the last three seconds.
Gossip is emitted to a random subset of peers that may or
may not be part of the mesh. It is important to note that gos-
siping does not happen exclusively between nodes outside
the mesh to/from nodes inside the mesh as shown in Fig. 1.
In other words, these are not two mutually exclusive groups.
All peers emit gossip and direct it to random peers through
their connection lists. For instance, Peer A1 in Fig. 1 can gos-
sip both to Node X, which is currently not part of the mesh
and to C, which is part of the mesh. It is worth highlighting
though that nodes connected to the mesh are more likely to
have received messages before the gossip arrives at the next
heartbeat (i.e., ∼1 s later).
Gossip is emitted on every heartbeat according to awindow-
based mcache shifting procedure to cover all messages seen
by a peer. In our current implementation, GossipSub is run-
ning three rounds of gossip upon three consecutive heart-
beats. In every round, peers choose only a subset of the peers
they know to emit gossip to. Therefore, not all peers will
“hear” about a message from the first gossip round and hence,
a second and third round is needed in order to guarantee
that all peers have received all messages. We discuss specific
settings for gossip dissemination as well as the choice of
three gossip rounds later, in Section 6.4.
Summarising, GossipSub is a blend of mesh-restricted eager
push for data and gossip-based lazy-pull for metadata. The
combination of those techniques guarantees responsiveness
to network conditions, but most importantly fast propaga-
tion as well as scalability in terms of traffic volume.
Eager push is more bandwidth demanding but results in
faster message propagation. There is a clear tradeoff between
the degree of the mesh (and, therefore, the volume of eager
push traffic) and the amount of gossip that needs to be emit-
ted in order to cover the entirety of the network. In Fig. 3
we present the relationship between these two components
of GossipSub. We present a thorough sensitivity analysis for
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the degree of the mesh (i.e., the value of D and its degree
parameters) in Section 10.2.
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Figure 3: GossipSub Tradeoffs
5 GOSSIPSUB: THE SCORE FUNCTION
The score function is used as a performance monitoring
mechanism to identify and remove badly-behaving nodes
from the mesh. Each peer in the mesh is keeping a score for
every other peer1 that it directly interacts with2 but scores
are not shared between peers. Sharing one’s view of another
peer with others would effectively result in a reputation
system. Reputation systems come with their own set of chal-
lenges, e.g., colluding attacks, which we have left for future
investigation. The scoring mechanism is plugged into vari-
ous GossipSub algorithms such that peers that behave cor-
rectly attain positive score, while those that misbehave are
penalised with negative score and are eventually removed
from the mesh.
5.1 Building the Score Function
We have designed a generic and modular function to incor-
porate all the important parameters through which we can
identify honest or malicious behaviour, in order to reward
or penalise peers accordingly. The modularity of the score
function allows for addition of more parameters depending
on application-specific deployments. The score function is
a weighted sum of parameters with the weights being set
according to environment conditions. Some parameters are
specific to topics, while others apply across all topics that
the observing peer is subscribed to.
Score(peer ) = TC(
4∑
n=1
wn(ti ) ∗Pn(ti ))+w5 ∗P5+w6 ∗P6 (1)
1The overhead of keeping state for other peers is minimal, in the area of
0.5KB per observed peer.
2Every peer keeps only a partial view of the network; there is no peer with
the full view of the network or the mesh.
where TC is the TopicCap and ti is the topic weight for each
topic where per topic parameters apply. Note that for the
purposes of this study, we experiment with one topic only
and in particular we consider the Block propagation topic of
the Filecoin and ETH2.0 networks.
The topic parameters are implemented using counters
maintained internally by the router whenever an event of
interest occurs. The parameters are defined as follows.
• P1: Time in Mesh (for a topic). This is the time a peer has
been in the mesh, capped to a small value and mixed with
a small positive weight. P1 is intended to mitigate flash
attacks and boost peers already in the mesh.
• P2: First Message Deliveries (for a topic). This is the
number of messages first delivered by the peer in the topic,
mixed with a positive weight. P2 is intended to reward
peers who act fast on relaying messages.
• P3a :Mesh Message Delivery Rate (for a topic). This pa-
rameter is a threshold for the expected message delivery
rate within the local mesh. If the number of deliveries is
above the threshold, then the value is 0. If the number
is below the threshold, then the value of the parameter
is the square of the deficit. P3a is intended to penalize
peers in the mesh who are likely to silently be dropping
messages so that they are removed from the mesh. The
parameter is mixed with a negative weight and is capped.
The implementation of P3a has to include a configurable
time window within which message delivery is considered
valid. The time window has to be kept in order to avoid
a peer building score by simply replaying back messages
received by a particular peer.
• P3b :Mesh Message Delivery Failures (for a topic). P3b
counts the number of mesh message delivery failures.
Whenever a peer is pruned with a negative score, the
parameter is augmented by the rate deficit at the time of
prune. P3b is intended to keep history of prunes so that a
peer which was pruned because of under-delivery cannot
quickly re-graft onto the mesh. The parameter is mixed
with negative weight and is uncapped, in order to create
stickiness of negative score for as long as the peer misbe-
haves.
• P4: Invalid Messages (for a topic). The P4 parameter is in-
tended to penalize peers who transmit invalidmessages, ac-
cording to application-specific validation rules. It is mixed
with a negative weight and is uncapped, again, in order to
increasingly penalise peers for as long as they send invalid
messages.
• P5: Application-Specific score. P5 is the score compo-
nent assigned to the peer using application-specific logic.
The weight is positive, but the parameter itself has an
arbitrary real value, so that the application can signal mis-
behaviour with a negative score or gate peers before an
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application-specific handshake is completed. One exam-
ple of an application-specific score is staked participation
[15, 18].
• P6: IP Address Collocation Factor. P6 is intended to
make it difficult to carry out Sybil attacks by using a small
number of IP addresses. If the number of peers connecting
from the same IP exceeds an application-specific threshold,
then the value of P6 is the square of the surplus, otherwise
it is 0. The parameter is mixed with a negative weight.
The combination of score function parameters have been
designed such that are difficult to manipulate. For example,
staying connected in the mesh for a long time (to build up P1)
and behaving properly (i.e., forwarding all messages) incurs
operational costs to the attacker. In Sec. 10.1 we show that the
cost of an attack can potentially be as high as $40,000/month.
On the other hand, staying connected but not forwarding
traffic, in order to save bandwidth costs will trigger negative
scoring for P2 and P3a .
5.2 Topic Value Decay
The counters for all of these function parameters decay peri-
odically so that their values are not consistently increasing
(or decreasing) and ensure that a large positive or negative
score is not sticky for the lifetime of the peer. The decay inter-
val is configurable by the application, with shorter intervals
resulting in faster decay.
The decay factor and interval together determine the ab-
solute rate of decay for each parameter. For example, a decay
interval of 1 second and a decay factor of 0.90, will cause a
decrease of 10% every second.
6 GOSSIPSUB MITIGATION STRATEGIES
We discuss the mitigation strategies that we have incorpo-
rated into GossipSub in decreasing level of effectiveness and
complexity, all of which are tailor-made to suit the main
building blocks and features of the protocol. We map mitiga-
tion strategies to attacks in Table 1.
6.1 Controlled Mesh Maintenance
The GRAFT mechanism of GossipSub creates an attack vec-
tor, as malicious nodes can create multiple Sybil identities
and send GRAFT messages to honest peers. As more Sybil
nodes attempt GRAFT requests, honest peers go over the
D_high threshold (discussed in Section 4.2). If peers PRUNE
their connections randomly in order to keep between D_low
and D_high (Fig. 2), they will (statistically) prune honest
peers in favour ofmalicious ones, especially as the sybil:honest
node ratio increases. The situation results in malicious nodes
controlling most or all of the connections in honest nodes’
local meshes.
As an immediate mitigation strategy, GossipSub is pruning
peers selectively. The score that peers keep for their neigh-
bours enables them to make more informed pruning deci-
sions. In particular, when pruning because of oversubscrip-
tion, the peer keeps the best scoring peers from its existing
mesh and selects the remaining peers to GRAFT at random
from its list of known/seen peers. This protects the mesh
from takeover attacks and ensures that the best scoring peers
are kept in the mesh. At the same time, GossipSub allows for
grafting of a few new peers, so that the protocol is responsive
to new peers joining the network.
We realise this concept through two extra mesh mainte-
nance variables.
6.1.1 Index of best performing peers, D_score. This is an
index of the best-performing existing peers in the node’s
local mesh. In the current implementation we set D_score=6.
Recall that D=8, D_high=12, D_low=6.
6.1.2 Outbound Mesh Connection Quotas, D_out. We are
augmenting the mesh construction with connection direc-
tionality (i.e., inbound vs outbound connections). Outbound
connections to honest peers are important in an adversar-
ial environment in order for a node that is under attack to
avoid being silenced. From the Sybils’ point of view, it is eas-
ier to join the network and attempt to occupy all incoming
connections to the target node by simply opening multiple
connections to it. Instead, it is more difficult to attract out-
bound connections, which are initiated by the honest node
itself. D_out is adjusted during the mesh maintenance so
that it is lower than D_low, but never exceeds D/2.
Summarising, the mesh maintenance process is run on ev-
ery heartbeat (i.e., every 1 s) to: i) prune peers with negative
score from the node’s local mesh, ii) choose only peers with
positive scores to graft to, in case of under-subscription, and
iii) always maintain at least D_out outgoing connections.
Mitigates: Sybil, flash and eclipse attacks, according to which
an attacker is spinning up a large number of Sybils to take
over the mesh.
6.2 Opportunistic Grafting
In cases of significant rates of churn of honest nodes, or a
successful take over of a peer’s mesh, an honest peer can
get stuck with a mesh of poorly performing peers. When
this happens, the router will normally react through mesh
failure penalties (P3a , P4, P6) in Section 5), but this reaction
time can be slow: the peers selected to replace the negative
scoring peers are chosen at random among the non-negative
scoring peers, which may result in multiple rounds of selec-
tions from a Sybil-poisoned pool before the mesh becomes
healthy again. Furthermore, the population of Sybils may
be so large that the sticky mesh failure penalties completely
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decay before any good peers are selected, thus making Sybils
re-eligible for grafting.
In order to recover from these extreme conditions, we have
introduced an “opportunistic grafting” mechanism, according
to which peers periodically check the median score of other
peers in their mesh against a threshold. This threshold is a
preset positive real[/integer], defined based on experimental
evaluation of a healthy network. If the median score is below
the threshold, the peer opportunistically grafts extra peers
with score above the median in the mesh. This improves an
under-performing mesh by introducing good-scoring peers
that may have been gossiping to honest nodes.
Opportunistic grafting is applied periodically with the rec-
ommended period being set to 1 min, while the number of
peers that are opportunistically grafted is controlled by the
application. For instance, it may be desirable to graft more
peers if the application has configured a larger mesh than
the default parameters.
Mitigates: Successfulmesh take-over and therefore, a poisoned-
pool mesh, seen in the Cold-Boot and Covert Flash Attacks.
6.3 Flood Publishing
We are introducing “Flood Publishing”, according to which
every newly published message is sent to all known peers
with a positive score that are subscribed to the topic. This
applies regardless of whether the publisher is subscribed to
the topic.
As is the case with flooding more generally, this behaviour
reduces message propagation latency at the cost of increased
bandwidth requirement. However, the fact that in GossipSub
we use flooding for the publisher node only and not for the
whole network strikes the right balance between avoiding
overloading the network, achieving good propagation la-
tency and achieving good protection against eclipse attacks.
Mitigates: Flood publishing is very effective in countering
all identified attacks where Sybils attempt to eclipse or cen-
sor a specific target or the whole network in either warm or
cold conditions.
6.4 Adaptive Gossip Dissemination
In order to counter against varying number of Sybils in the
network, we have decided to dynamically adjust the gossip
that the protocol emits based on the peer’s known connections.
The parameter controlling the emission of gossip is called
“gossip factor” and is set to 0.25 (25%) for the purposes of the
present study. This means that in each round every peer is
emitting gossip to 25% of its known peers that are not part of
its local mesh. The specific setting of 0.25 for the gossip factor
was chosen so that every node has at least 50% probability
of receiving a message through gossip.3
Mitigates: Enhances the resistance of the protocol against
eclipse attacks, in case of significant number of Sybils.
6.5 Backoff on PRUNE
According to GossipSub’s mesh construction rules, when a
node is oversubscribed, in terms of number of nodes in its
local mesh, it prunes peers to bring its mesh back to normal
size (below D_high). This functionality is extended to add a
backoff period before a pruned peer can attempt to re-graft.
This action helps preserve the mesh from Sybil nodes that
attempt continuous GRAFTs to take over the mesh of the
node. The recommended duration for the backoff is 1 min.
Mitigates: GRAFT spam attacks and generally keeping ma-
licious nodes away from the mesh.
7 INFRASTRUCTURE SETUP &
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
7.1 The Testground Environment
In order to evaluate the performance of GossipSub under
realistic conditions, we have built Testground, a platform for
testing, benchmarking, and simulating distributed and peer-
to-peer systems at scale. Testground is designed to support
reproducibility of results, it is platform-agnostic, but most
importantly is able to scale to any number of instances. With
Testground tests can run either as executables or docker con-
tainers locally, or in Kubernetes-based cloud environments.
In Testground VMs are instantiated and connected according
to configuration files written separately. We provide a de-
tailed description of our test environment in Section 10.3 and
we make all of our test plans and configuration files publicly
available for reproducibility.4 The codebase for GossipSub is
approximately 16000 LOC5, with about half of it for event
tracing and tests.
We have run our evaluation using Testground Kubernetes
clusters onAWS and allocate 1.2 vCPUs and 2 GBs ofmemory
per container node.
7.2 Evaluation Methodology
We tested GossipSub in many more attack scenarios than
discussed in Section 3, but can only present a subset of them
due to space limitations. In particular, we present results for
the following three attacks: i) Network-Wide Eclipse Attack,
ii) Cold Boot Attack, and iii) Covert Flash Attack. This set of
3Given дossip f actor = 0.25, the probability of a node not receiving a
message through gossip is 0.75rounds , or 0.42 for the three gossip rounds,
which leaves us with a probability of 0.58 of receiving a message through
gossip. Note that this figure is independent of the Sybil to honest node ratio.
4Hidden for double-blind review.
5Publicly available at: https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-pubsub
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GossipSub Attack & Mitigation Strategy Summary
Mitigation
Attack Sybil Eclipse Censor Cold
Boot
Covert
Flash
Backoff on PRUNE (Sec. 6.5) ✓
Adaptive Gossip Dissemination (Sec. 6.4) ✓ ✓
Controlled Mesh Maintenance (Sec. 6.1) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Opportunistic Grafting (Sec. 6.2) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Flood Publishing (Sec. 6.3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 1: GossipSub Attacks vs Mitigation Strategies
attacks covers the most challenging scenarios and provides
a detailed insight into the behaviour of the protocol.
We compare GossipSub against:
(1) Bitcoin’s Flooding/Broadcast protocol. We emulate
the performance of the Bitcoin blockchain at the network
layer by assuming only public nodes, which open 133
connections in total (125 inbound and 8 outbound).
(2) ETH1.0’s sqrt(N)-based pubsub protocol, according
to which newly published messages are forwarded to
the square root of the number of nodes in the network.
For our tests in this study, where we assume 1000 hon-
est nodes, the degree of the sqrt(N) protocol equals 32,
which is the setting we are using.
(3) Plain GossipSub (occasionally denoted as pGM) for a
version of GossipSub without the scoring function or the
attack mitigation strategies.
We are using 2) and 3) above as benchmark protocols to
approximate the performance of traditional pubsub protocols.
We highlight that although this is a simplistic approach to
the comparison against the vast related literature, here we
want to focus on the mitigation properties of GossipSub in
adversarial environments. As we show in the next Section,
the attacks investigated have such severe impact on protocol
performance that non-security design choices do not actually
affect performance much.
We believe that this set of protocols captures the whole
picture for message propagation in open, permissionless
blockchains, according to current practices and the most
popular blockchain networks in operation today.
7.3 Evaluation Setup & Metrics
Unless otherwise mentioned, the following settings apply to
our test scenarios. We setup 1000 honest nodes (100 publish-
ers and 900 full nodes) and 4000 Sybils targeting every honest
node in the network. We assume that Sybils can establish
100 connections each, while honest nodes only up to 20. This
brings the Sybil:honest connection ratio to 20:1.6 We have
6We have experimented with smaller as well as bigger connection ratios
and we confirm that performance trends remain as reported here.
chosen these settings for the maximum number of Sybil and
honest node connections in order to evaluate a worst-case
scenario. In reality, honest nodes will be able to open many
more connections, subject to bandwidth and CPU resources.
We focus our attention on the Block topic in terms of
message delivery deadlines, where the Filecoin and ETH2.0
networks have hard global delivery deadlines at 6 s and 12 s,
respectively, after message generation. However, in order to
stress-test the system we apply much higher message rates
and experiment with 120 messages/sec.7
The primary metrics of successful attack mitigation are: i)
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) lower than 6 s for
the Filecoin network and 12 s for ETH2.0, and ii) the per-
centage of message loss. We report early on that we have
not observed message loss for GossipSub in any of the tests
we have run. We report message loss for the other protocols
where applicable. We measure the Probability Distribution
Function and present the 99th percentile of the global propa-
gation latency (denoted as “p99”) and also capture the score
profile of honest and attacker peers in order to get an un-
derstanding of the protocol’s behaviour. Last, but not least,
we monitor the bandwidth cost of message propagation in
terms of the number of duplicate message delivery.
8 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
8.1 Network-wide Eclipse Attack
Given GossipSub’s mesh construction properties, the Eclipse
attack is executed by having a large number of Sybils con-
tinuously attempting to graft onto the mesh. They Sybils are
targeting all nodes in the network and attempt to occupy
as many connections of each node as possible. Once they
do, they drop all messages to and from the nodes they have
managed to connect to.
The attack takes place in a warm network, where honest
nodes join the network and form meshes at t0 = 0sec , while
attackers are introduced at t1 = 60sec into the test. We have
confirmed that this is a long-enough interval for honest
7We have tested the performance of all protocols with message rates up to
1000 msgs/sec and confirm that performance follows similar trends.
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nodes to setup their local meshes and build a score profile
by varying the warm-up time.
Our results show that plain GossipSub is completely dev-
astated by the attack. The system starts losing messages
immediately with the latency of delivered packets reaching
up to 50secs (not presented here for clarity of Fig. 4) and
∼ 10% message loss. The results indicate a successful attack
in taking over the mesh with successful message propagation
happening almost purely through gossip.
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Figure 4: Network-Wide Eclipse Attack
In contrast, GossipSub is totally immune to the attack. The
attackers only manage to occupy a few slots in the mesh,
which does not make any dent to the delivery rate. The max-
imum message propagation latency is at 178ms (see Fig. 4)
with the p99 at 141 ms.
These values are identical to the “Baseline Scenario” re-
sults that we present in Section 10.2, where there are no
attacker nodes. This behaviour indicates that most attacker
nodes do not even make it to the mesh, given that the attack
happens on a warm network.
In particular, selective score-driven peer selection ensures
that nodes are accepting just a few new/low-scoring nodes
in the mesh, keeping a portion of their connections grafted
to their old, high-scoring peers. Therefore, an army of Sybils
attacking a warm node will only succeed in occupying a
minority of slots in the mesh. In this particular test, malicious
nodes occupy between 2 and 4 connections on average in
nodes’ local meshes, leaving enough connections to honest
nodes to propagate messages quickly through the network.
ETH1.0’s sqrt(N)-degree pubsub protocol completely fails
to resist the attack and results in total message propagation
of more than 11s with the p99 at ∼8s. It turns out that even
Bitcoin’s simple broadcast protocol with 133 total connec-
tions per node is also severely affected with a CDF above
4s (Fig. 4) and p99 at 3s - roughly three times faster than
ETH1.0’s sqrt(N), i.e., approximately equal to the fan-out
difference of the two protocols.8
8Recall that for a network of 1000 nodes, ETH1.0’s protocol is forwarding
maintaining ∼ 32 connections.
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Figure 5: Cold Boot Attack
8.2 Cold Boot Attack
In this attack, honest and Sybil nodes join the network con-
currently. In fact, in order to test the worst case scenario, we
let Sybil nodes connect first and form meshes between them.
Honest peers join 2 min into the test and attempt to build
their mesh in a Sybil-dominated network. As a result most of
the D connections of honest nodes are opened towards Sybil
nodes. Sybils dominate the mesh and carry out an eclipse
attack, where they drop both incoming and outgoing mes-
sages.
Plain GossipSub fails to respond to the attack. It not only
delivers messages with prohibitively long delay (up to 17 s
and p99 at 10 s) but also fails to propagate ∼4% of messages.
GossipSub achieves 100% message propagation and is only
slightly affected by the attack with some messages delayed
for up to 1.2 s as shown Fig. 5 - well within the 6 s window.
Bitcoin’s broadcast protocol increases message propagation
latency by 100% compared to GossipSub to 2.4 s, but still
achieves somewhat acceptable performance, being able to
meet the 6 s deadline of Filecoin and ETH2.0 networks. Note,
however, that this comes at a severe bandwidth cost: Bit-
coin’s broadcast protocol sends an order of magnitude more
duplicate messages, 1.8M, compared to GossipSub’s 153k. We
argue that this is an enormous cost, which although makes
an attack against the network more expensive in terms of
bandwidth requirement for malicious nodes, it also increases
significantly the cost of operating honest nodes.9 ETH1.0’s
sqrt(N)-based protocol fails to recover from the attack with
most of its nodes remaining primarily connected to Sybils.
The protocol is failing to meet the deadline with the CDF
of global propagation latency at almost 6 s again shown in
Fig. 5 (left) and p99 at 4 s.
In Fig. 6 we present the state of the mesh throughout
the duration of the experiment. Given the experiment setup,
the mesh is initially poisoned as Sybils join the network
before honest nodes and dominate mesh connections. It is
remarkable to see that GossipSub manages to recover the
mesh within 90 heartbeats, i.e., ∼1.5 m. Despite the Sybil-
dominance duration, GossipSub manages to neither lose mes-
sages nor delay message propagation prohibitively.
9We discuss bandwidth requirements in more detail in Section 10.1.
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We present results from a test without opportunistic graft-
ing, and also include a test with the gossip factor increased to
0.4 from its default value of 0.25 (Section 6.4).With the default
settings (i.e., gossipFactor = 0.25 and OppGraft enabled)
the p99 is 205ms, while disabling opportunistic grafting in-
creases the p99 to 269ms. The CDF for these cases, as well as
for the case when we increase the gossipFactor = 0.4 is
shown in Fig. 5 (right). We see that increased gossip dissemi-
nation reduces the CDF to 920ms (compared to 1.235 s for
the default option), whereas disabling opportunistic grafting
increases the CDF to 1.315 s.
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Figure 6: Mesh Status - Cold Boot Attack
Clearly, the cold boot attack is a challenging one and re-
quires the whole array of mitigation measures to keep the
mesh in a healthy state and meet the propagation latency re-
quirements of the Filecoin and ETH2.0 blockchain networks.
8.3 Covert Flash Attack
This attack intends to cover cases where Sybils connect to the
network and behave properly for some period of time (2min
in our experiment) in order to build up score. Then, they
execute a coordinated network-wide eclipse attack whereby
they stop propagating messages in an attempt to completely
disrupt the network. The attack builds on the previous cold
boot attack in that Sybils and honest peers connect to the net-
work concurrently. Initial the mesh is dominated by Sybils,
who maintain their status by behaving properly until launch-
ing the attack.
Again, the whole array of defenses build into GossipSub
need to come into play in order to recover from this ex-
tremely challenging attack.
Plain GossipSub fails to respond to the attack, which re-
sults in message loss and delivery delays of more than 15 s
once the attack is launched. Both Bitcoin’s flooding protocol
and ETH1.0’s sqrt(N)-based pubsub protocol fail to meet
the 6 s deadline, despite the significant redundancy induced,
especially in the case of Bitcoin. Bitcoin’s protocol results
in 3.2M duplicate messages. ETH1.0’s sqrt(N) protocol is
closer to GossipSub with 230k duplicate messages, against
223k for GossipSub. The performance of GossipSub is re-
markable managing to recover rapidly from the attack and
recover the mesh to a healthy state. The maximum delivery
latency during recovery tops at about 1 s, similarly to previ-
ous attacks. The p99 of the global propagation latency for
GossipSub is only 197ms.
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Figure 7: Covert Flash Attack
8.4 Results Summary
Having investigated the widest possible range of attacks
for message propagation protocols in blockchain environ-
ments, we have not identified a case where the GossipSub
protocol breaks. Some complex attacks do have an effect
on performance, but do not manage to be successful. While
some parameters of the score function have a clear effect
on achieving resiliency (e.g., P3a and P3b ) some others work
silently on the background to augment the individual peer
view of the mesh. Flood publishing, opportunistic grafting
and increased gossip propagation enhance the performance
of the protocol significantly under the most adversarial en-
vironments. It is this combination of strategies that keep the
protocol resilient against all identified cases.
In some attacks, a few of the mitigation strategies are
enough to keep the protocol in normal operation. In some of
the more complex attacks, the whole arsenal of mitigation
strategies has to be utilised in order to keep the effect of
the attacks to acceptable levels. We have tested, but are not
presenting results that test the resistance of the protocol
against collocated Sybils (through the IP Collocation Factor)
and SPAM attacks. These are less sophisticated attacks that
GossipSub can handle comfortably.
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We presented GossipSub, a gossip-based, pubsub messaging
protocol formessage propagation in permissionless blockchain
environments. To the best of our knowledge, GossipSub is
the first of its kind attack-resistant pubsub protocol that
integrates security measures natively at the protocol layer.
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Responsiveness to dynamic network conditions caused by
malicious activity has been the driving philosophy behind
the design of GossipSub. We have not found evidence of a
successful attack against GossipSub even in extreme, unreal-
istic attack scenarios.
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10 APPENDIX
10.1 Bandwidth Requirements & Cost of
Attack
In this section, we calculate the bandwidth requirements of
GossipSub in order to assess the cost of running Sybil nodes
and attack the network. Throughout our test campaign we
have assumed a message rate of 120 msg/sec and message
size of 2KBs. While the message size of 2 KB is a reason-
able setting, the message rate we have used is very high
for both the block and the transactions topic of the Filecoin
and the ETH2.0 networks, according to current predictions.
This was done on purpose, in order to stress-test the proto-
col behaviour, but is not an appropriate figure for assessing
bandwidth requirements. That said, we will calculate band-
width requirements for: i) block topic rate of 10 blocks/min,
that is, 5 blocks per round with round duration of 30 sec,
and ii) transactions topic rate of ∼2-4 transactions/second.
Where needed we vary these values to provide a holistic
picture.
The formula used to calculate bandwidth requirements is:
Bandwidth Req = msg_rate x msg_size x connections
According to GossipSub’s protocol design, a peer will form a
mesh with another 8-12 peers (excluding the peers that it is
gossiping with). Table 2 shows the bandwidth requirement
for the Blocks and the Transactions topics.
Data Vol. (GB/month)
Number of Blocks Transactions
Connections (10/min) (2/sec)
4 3.456 41.4
8 6.912 82.9
12 10.368 124.4
24 20.736 248.8
48 41.472 497.6
100 86.4 1036
Table 2: GBs/month requirement for Increasing Num-
ber of Connections for the Blocks and Transactions
Topics, assuming a rate of 10 newmessages perminute
(i.e., 5 per round) for Blocks and 2messages per second
for the Transactions Topic.
The green rows in the tables denote bandwidth require-
ment for GossipSub honest nodes and the red row is the
bandwidth requirement for Sybil nodes. We make the follow-
ing observations:
• Simple calculations reveal that the per-second bandwidth
requirement for Sybil nodes (i.e., 100 connections each)
and for Tx rate of only 2Tx/sec is 3.2Mbps.
• The bandwidth requirement for honest nodes is high but
not prohibitive.
• Traditionally, botnets are created by compromised user
machines, most commonly connected through home con-
nections. Home connection capacities are usually sufficient
for normal DDoS attacks and would also be enough for a
rate of 2Tx/sec. However, a botnet-based attack would be
hard to mount in the FIL/ETH2.0 case in the longer term as
the rate of Tx/sec increases. The bandwidth requirement
increases linearly with the number of Transactions, which
yields a bandwidth requirement of 12.8Mbps for 8 Tx/sec,
for instance - prohibitive for the majority of conventional
home connectivity compromised nodes.
• The bottom, red row of Table 2 indicates that for 10 blocks/min,
2 Tx/sec and 100 connections per node, a Sybil node re-
quires more than 1 TB of traffic per month. Again, the
figure increases linearly with the rate of transactions.
• According to our AWS-based tests, 1 vCPU with 1GB of
memory is enough for a Sybil node to open and operate
100 connections. The bandwidth requirement, however, is
non-trivial and hovers in the area between 1 TB and 2 TB.
Disregarding the risk ofmounting an attack from a contract-
based cloud environment, bandwidth-intensive plans come
at a non-trivial cost. DigitalOcean offers a 2 TB-compatible
plan for $10/month10.
Based on this figure, the attacks we tried against our 1000
honest node network, which ultimately proved unsuccessful,
would cost in the order of $40,000/month.
We should emphasize that in our test campaign we have
not found an attack that can successfully bend the performance
of GossipSub. The only somewhat effective attacks were the
cold boot and covert flash attacks, where the attack happens
at network formation time. Even in those cases, however, we
have proved that the effect on GossipSub’s performance was
minimal and the network successfully recovered in a short
period of time (Section 8.2).
10.2 D Value Sensitivity Analysis
We carry out a sensitivity analysis for the degree of Gossip-
Sub’s D value. As discussed earlier, there is a clear tradeoff
between the degree of the mesh and the performance of the
protocol in terms of bandwidth requirements and message
propagation latency (see Figure 3). In Table 3 we present a
subset of the range of D values that we experimented with.
10https://www.digitalocean.com/pricing/
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GossipSub D-Value Settings
Lo_D def_D Hi_D VHi_D
D: Degree of Mesh 4 8 16 32
D_low (D -25%) 3 6 12 24
D_score (D -25%) 3 6 12 24
D_high (D +50%) 6 12 24 48
Table 3: Range of D Values Tested
Lower degree for the mesh (Lo_D=4) results in lower number
of duplicate messages (∼100k) (approximately half of those
for the default D values, ∼227k), but also higher message
propagation latency - 245ms for “Low D”, compared to 185ms
for the “Default D” value (Table 4). Increasing the degree
of the mesh to Hi_D=16 decreases message propagation la-
tency (by ∼25ms) but results in more than 100% increase in
the number of duplicate messages - ∼480k in case of “High
D”, compared to ∼227k for the “Default D”. Increasing the D
value further to 32 makes virtually no difference in terms of
message propagation latency, but increases the number of
duplicate messages by 100%, as shown in Table 4.
GossipSub D-Value Sensitivity Analysis - Baseline Test
Low D
(D=4)
Default
D (D=8)
High D
(D=16)
Very High
D (D=32)
Max Latency 245ms 185ms 161ms 160ms
p99 PDF 175ms 139ms 117ms 113ms
Duplicates* 100k 227k 480k 995k
Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis Results
The number of duplicate messages (and as a consequence the
volume of redundant traffic) increases exponentially with the
degree of the mesh. This is also the case with the amount of
traffic that the protocol produces as a result of higher-degree
connectivity. In Table 5, we present the bandwidth require-
ments for increasing number of transactions per second for
GossipSub (degree ∼8), ETH1.0’s sqrt(N)-based protocol
(degree ∼32 for 1000 nodes) and Bitcoin’s broadcast protocol
(degree ∼133 for public Bitcoin nodes).
Based on these observations, we deemed the value of D=8
as a reasonable setting and have used this by default. Al-
though different settings might be more suitable for different
environments, this setting has proved to be ideal for the wide
range of scenarios tested.
Data Vol. (GB/month)
Tx/sec GossipSub ETH1.0 Bitcoin
2 124.4 331.7 1378
4 248.8 663.5 2757
8 497.6 1327 5515
16 995.3 2654 11031
32 1990 5308 22063
64 3981 10616 44126
Table 5: GB/month for an increasing number of Trans-
actions for GossipSub (D = 12 connections), Ethereum
(32 connections for a network of 1k nodes), Bitcoin
(133 connections in total, 125 inbound, 8 outbound)
10.3 Testground Description
The Testground runtime builds on a traditional daemon/client
architecture, communicating over HTTP. This architecture
is flexible enough to run the daemon within a shared cluster,
with many users, developers, and integrations (e.g., GitHub
Actions) hitting the same daemon to schedule build and run
jobs.
Testground includes a number of attractive features for
experimentation and reproducibility of results.
• Distributed coordination API. Redis-backed lightweight
API offering synchronisation primitives to coordinate
and orchestrate distributed test workloads across a
fleet of nodes.
• Tunable Network Conditions. Bandwidth, latency, jit-
ter and packet-loss can be tuned to emulate realistic
network conditions.
• AWS cluster setup scripts.Testground comeswith scripts
to setup AWS clusters and reproduce results from pre-
vious tests.
• Composition-based declarative jobs. Tailored test run
scripts to compose scenarios in a declarative manner.
• Results and diagnostics. When a test run completes
debugging logs and results are collected for easy post-
processing using Python Jupyter notebooks.
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